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Abstract
A national labour and welfare administration reform (NAV reform) is evaluated on
employment outcomes and use of social insurance and assistance schemes. The reform
was implemented step-wise over time during 2006—2010 at diﬀerent geographical loc-
ations. Thus, we are able to create treatment and control groups to facilitate causal
interpretations of the empirical results. We use a data set on individuals where we
match local implementation of the reform to individual data on social security, em-
ployment, and socioeconomic characteristics. The labour and welfare administration
was until 2006 fragmented, involving three large public agencies (employment, social
assistance, and social insurance services), with limited coordination and collabora-
tions. The reform merged these institutions into a new organization called NAV, after
the “one door for all” principle (“one-stop-centres”). The idea was to help users get
faster back to work after a period of sickness or unemployment through coordinated
help by generalist case worker competence. We find that this was not the case for
the implementation year and the following years, and that the reform failed to reap
the intended benefits of the merger process, at least in the short term. This could be
due to the fact that most users still demand specialized case worker competence, in-
adequate planning of IT infrastructure, large training requirements of staﬀ, increased
number of users during the 2008 financial crisis, and the buildup of new specialized
teams in 2008 that took competent workers away from the day-to-day operation of
the new NAV organization. Large bureaucratic organizational reforms can take many
years to implement after a turbulent implementation face, and can have short term
costs for users. The turbulence of the reform was not fully anticipated even though
25 oﬃces in diﬀerent municipalities and city districts participated in a pilot project 6
1
months before the country-wide implementation process started.
JEL Numbers: C3, I12, I2, C21, H51
Keywords: welfare reform, sick leave, econometric evaluation, heterogeneity
1 Introduction
The social insurance system is under pressure in many countries mainly from an aging
population and an increased number of people leaving the labour market. Old age
pension is the largest social insurance scheme, but more than 10 % of the potential
labour force1 are now on disability pension in Norway. Absence through sickness
represents the third major type of financial transfers from the social insurance system
to individuals. There is also a worrying connection between long-term absence through
sickness and progression to a disability pension where people permanently leave the
labour force. On a given working day, around 6.0 % of the work-force (130,000 persons)
receive sickness benefits based on a sickness certificate from a general practitioner
(GP) (NAV Statistics 2012). Unemployment insurance and social assistance are also
an important part of the welfare state.
Pressure to increase the eﬃciency of the governmental sector has led to several
reforms. The pension reform implemented in January 2010 uses financial incentives
to get people to stay longer in the labour force, and the reform has to a large degree
archived that goal (Dahl and Galaasen (2013)). However, the Norwegian government
has failed on several occasions to change the sickness insurance system by introducing
financial incentives for employers and employees, as has happened in the Netherlands
(Everhardt and Jong (2011)) and Sweden (Johansson and Palme (1996)).
The labour and welfare administration was until 2006 divided into three main pub-
lic agencies whose coordination and collaboration was limited. Especially multi-service
users or clients were struggling in a system where many case workers had specialized
tasks. Around 15 % of all users needed to apply for help from several diﬀerent oﬃces;
Fevang, Røed, Westlie, and Zhang (2004), Christensen and Lægreid (2010). In 2001,
it was decided to reform the labour and welfare administration by merging three large
public agencies: the Norwegian Public Employment Services (PES), the National In-
surance Services (NIS), and the municipality based Social Welfare Services (SWS).
The new entity is called NAV.
1Background: The population in Norway in the age group 18-66 was 3.2 million in 2012. The total
population is 5 million. The number of employed persons was 2,8 million in 2012, of which 1,9 million
are full time employed. There are 1.37 million employed males, of which 1,17 million are full time
employed. For females, there are 1,23 million employed, of which 730,000 are full time employed.
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The three main goals of the NAV reform are a) to get more people into work
and reduce the number of persons on welfare schemes like sickness, social assistance
and unemployment; b) to create a more eﬃcient administrative apparatus, and c) to
make the administration more service-oriented, (Askim, Christensen, Fimreite, and
Lægreid (2010)). We will look closer into employment outcomes and the use of welfare
schemes in our analysis for groups of the population that has a high probability of
having contact with the welfare system. These groups include long-term unemployed,
persons having health problems, and young school drop-outs.2
NAV was implemented step-wise over time at diﬀerent geographical locations. The
implementation period lasted from October 2006 to April 2011. Norway has 435 muni-
cipalities, and 19 counties including Oslo. The four large cities (Oslo, Bergen, Trond-
heim, and Stavanger) are in addition divided into urban administrative district with
their own labour and welfare administration. 25 municipalities/districts implemented
the reform in October 2006 as a pilot project, where one municipality was selected
more or less randomly from each of the 19 counties. In addition, 6 urban administrat-
ive districts from the two largest cities (Oslo and Bergen) were also selected at the
same time. The last municipality implemented the reform in April 2011, but most of
the 457 new oﬃces were established by the end of 2009, where the main roll out period
was from 2007 to 2009. The randomisation of municipalities was not perfect in a stat-
istical sense (no coin or other randomisation device was used), but it was important
that the selection of municipalities should be geographical stratified and implemented
progressively over time. This was also the case for most urban administrative district.
For instance, Oslo has 15 urban districts, the first one implemented the reform in 2006
(Sagene/Nordre Aker) and the last one at the end of 2010 (Nordstrand). Thus, at
each period from 2006 to 2010 we have individuals belonging to the diversified system
of three organizations (comparison group) and persons belonging to the new merged
oﬃce system (treatment group) which is now called NAV.
We use this step-wise implementation of the reform to estimate causal eﬀects on
employment and use of social insurance and benefits within the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
framework (Heckman and Honore (1990), Lazear (2000), Bhuller, Havnes, Leuven,
and Mogstad (2013)). We have population data from 2003 to 2011 with information
on income, employment, use of diﬀerent social insurance (unemployment benefits,
disability benefits, sickness benefits, old age pension, rehabilitation benefits) and social
assistance benefits. Thus we observe all people before, during and after the reform with
2Schreiner (2012), Schreiner and Markussen (2012) and Fevang, Markussen, and Røed (2013) have
done similar studies focusing on duration of spells before, during and after the NAV reform. Their
analysis has a diﬀerent research design and study population.
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a follow up period of at least one year. We sample diﬀerent groups of individuals prior
to the reform in 2007, and follow individuals over time in the two diﬀerent systems
until pratically all municipalities had implemented the reform in 2010. We use the
panel data design since the fixed-eﬀects model is robust compared to many other
empirical models when it comes to selection issues into the “treatment” and “control”
group. We evaluate the reform on employment3 and the use of social insurance and
social assistance after periods of sickness or unemployment prior to the start of the
implementation process.
The idea of the NAV reform was to facilitate labour-market integration, e.g., help
users get faster back to work after a period of sickness or unemployment through
coordinated help by generalist case worker competence, based on an integrated service
model that is speading in Europe, e.g. Minas (2014). We find that this not the case
for the national implementation period from late 2006 to early 2010. We find that
the NAV reform failed to reap the intended benefits of the merger process in terms
of increased employment and reduced use of social insurance schemes. This could
be due to the fact that most users still demand specialized case worker competence,
inadequate planning of IT infrastructure, and large training requirements of staﬀ.
Large bureaucratic organizational reforms can take many years to implement after a
turbulent implementation face, and can have short term costs for users. The turbulence
of the reform was not fully anticipated even though 25 oﬃces in diﬀerent municipalities
and city districts participated in a pilot project 6 months before the country-wide
implementation process started.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, institutional background on the
reform. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical section. Section 4 presents
the empirical set-up. Section 5 presents the main estimation results from the model.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background to the reform
The labour and welfare administration was until 2006 divided into three main public
agencies whose coordination and collaboration was limited. Especially multi-service
users or clients were supposedly struggling in a system where many case workers had
specialized tasks. Around 15 % of all users needed to apply for help from several
diﬀerent oﬃces; Fevang, Røed, Westlie, and Zhang (2004). In 2001, it was decided to
reform the labour and welfare administration by merging three large public agencies:
3We base our measure of employment on actual work income. Spells of employment from register
data are inacurate and does not include self-employed persons.
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the Norwegian Public Employment Services (PES), the National Insurance Services
(NIS), and the municipality based Social Welfare Services (SWS). The new entity is
called NAV (“new employment and welfare administration”), involving 16,000 employ-
ees and 1/3 of the national government budget.
The NAV reform is a continuation of earlier reforms in the early 1990s focusing on
faster return to work for persons on social insurance schemes, in particular for persons
with long term health problems and disabilities. This was particular the case for
persons on vocational rehabilitation (VR). Many persons could stay on for many years
on VR, and in 1994 the responsibility for and the administration of VR clients related
to the return to work was transferred from the National Insurance Services (NIS) to the
Public Employment Services (PES), and a distinction between medical and vocational
rehabilitation was made. The administrative reform in 1994 has never been evaluated,
but Markussen and Røed (2014) estimate the impact of vocational rehabilitation on
short- and long-term labour market outcomes for persons that came under the risk of
being referred to VR from 1996 through 2005. They find that a strategy focusing on
rapid placement in the regular labour market is superior to alternative strategies giving
higher priority to vocational training or sheltered employment. Strategies prioritising
subsidized regular education also tend to be relatively successful in terms of final
outcomes, but at the cost of protracted periods of benefit dependency first. They
suggest more use of subsidized employment in the regular labour market, and a more
restricted use of training courses and referrals to sheltered firms.
Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) find on average no positive employment
eﬀects of vocational rehabilitation for clients that ended their rehabilitation eﬀort
prior to the reform in 1994, but Aakvik (2001) find a positive eﬀect for clients with
a low estimated probability of employment. A comparison of studies before and after
the reform in 1994 shows that more focus on active re-employment strategies by the
employment service seems to have had a positive eﬀect compared to passive receipt
of social insurance without focus on re-employment as was the case for many clients
prior to the reform in 1994.
The generous Nordic welfare states hinges on high employment rates, and a continu-
ous concern about high disability and sickness rates has spurred other administrative
changes such as the one in 2000 where the requirements for permanent disability bene-
fits were made clearer and more demanding, see for instance Ekhaugen (2006). Other
administrative reforms include the “Faster return to work” (FRW) scheme that focus
on reducing waiting times for treatment, and thus the total length of sick leave. The
main idea behind the FRW scheme is that long waiting times for hospital treatment
lead to unnecessarily long periods of sick leave and postponed return to work after
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illness or injury. The reform has been evaluated by Aakvik, Holmås, and Kjerstad
(2012). They find that the average waiting period for treatment or consultation for
FRW patients (treatment group) is 12—15 days shorter than for people on sick leave
on the regular waiting list (comparison group). This reduction is only partially trans-
formed into a reduction in the total length of sick leave. On average, the reduction is
approximately eight days. There is a significant diﬀerence between surgical and non-
surgical patients, where surgical patients benefit the most from the reform in terms of
significantly faster return to work. There is find no eﬀect of the reform for non-surgical
patients.
The NAV reform is a continuation of the focus on high employment for all groups in
society as a foundation for a generous welfare state that characterizes the scandinavian
countries. The unemployment rate in Norway is very low, but the number of persons
on disability pension, rehabilitation benefits and sickness benefits are high compared
to other countries, OECD (2010).
3 Implemention of the NAV reform
The NAV reform was implemented step-wise over time at diﬀerent geographical loca-
tions as shown in Figure 1. Norway has 435 municipalities, and 19 counties including
Figure 1: Implementation of the NAV reform at the municipality level by quarter-year
(N=457).
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Oslo. The four large cities (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, and Stavanger) are in addition
divided into urban administrative district with their own labour and welfare adminis-
tration. 25 municipalities and city districts implemented the reform in October 2006
as a pilot project, where one municipality were selected more or less randomly from
each of the 19 counties. In addition, 6 city administrative districts from the two largest
cities (Oslo and Bergen) were also selected at the same time. The last municipality
implemented the reform in April 2011 (Kristiansand), but most of the 457 new oﬃces
were established by the end of 2009, where the main roll out period was from 2007 to
2009, as can be seen from the figure. Municipalities finance social assistance, whereas
social insurance is covered by the central government. In addition to NAV oﬃces in
each municipality/city distritc, NAV has also established county oﬃces with particular
tasks and administrative functions.
The randomisation of municipalities was not perfect in a statistical sense (no coin
or other randomisation device was used), but it was important that the selection of
municipalities should be geographical stratified and implemented progressively over
time. This was also the case for most urban administrative district. For instance,
Oslo has 15 city districts, the first one implemented the reform in 2006 (Sagene/Nordre
Aker) and the last one at the end of 2010 (Nordstrand). Thus, at each period from 2006
to 2010 we have individuals belonging to the diversified system of three organizations
(comparison group) and persons belonging to the new merged oﬃce system (treatment
group) which is now called NAV.
3.1 The labour market
Labour market conditions have varied in the period from 2004 until today. The num-
ber of unemployed persons decreased steadily until the financial crises in 2008. The
Norwegian stock exchange was at it lowest in November 2008 with an index value
of 162. Three months earlier the stock exchange index was 375. Thus, there was a
substantial drop in the value of companies listed at the stock exchange of almost 60
percent during the turmoil in fall 2008. The economy started to recover in late 2009.
Two years after its lowest value, the stock exchange was back at its pre-crisis value in
November 2010.
The number of unemployed persons varied a lot during our observation period.
Figure 2 shows the number of unemployed male persons in the relevant period.4 We
can see that the number of registered unemployed persons doubled in 2008 from around
20000 to 40000 (male) individuals. The number of registered unemployed persons vary
4The figure for females looks very similar.
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Figure 2: Average number of unemployed male persons, 2005—2013. Unadjusted
monthly data, N=428 municipalities. Source: Statistics Norway.
by season, but the general trend is decreasing from the autumn of 2009. We have not
seasonal adjusted the data as is common in oﬃcial statistics.
The NAV reform was implemented stage wise (see Figure 1). Figure 3 shows the
implementation date and how this date varied a lot in terms of the general unemploy-
ment rate. Figure 3 shows the number of unemployed male persons in the relevant
evaluation period and the timing of the implementation of the NAV reform at the
municipality level. The early municipalities implemented the reform in a period with
very low unemployment before the credit crises in the autumn of 2008 compared to
the unemployment today. The unemployment rate increased during 2009 and reached
its maximum early 2010. The credit crises falls just in the middle of the NAV imple-
mentation reform period from 2006 to 2010.
Figure 4 shows the unemployment rate for two groups of municipalities depending
on the implementation period. The blue line in Figure 4 shows the unemployment
rate for municipalities that implemented the reform in 2007 (second, third and fourth
quarter). The red line shows the unemployment rate for municipalities that imple-
mented the reform in 2009. The period up to and including the first quarter of 2007 is
the pre-treatment period for both municipalities, and the period from and including
2010 is the post-treatment period for both groups. In 2008 we have both a treatment
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Figure 3: Average number of unemployed male persons and the stage wise implement-
ation of the NAV reform. Unadjusted monthly data, N=428 municipalities. Source:
Statistics Norway (SSB), and Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD).
group (those that implemented the reform in 2007) and a comparison group (those that
implemented the reform in 2009). The two horisontal lines are based on the average
implementation period for the two groups of municipaliteis shown in the figure.
We can see from Figure 4 that the reform had a negative eﬀect in early 2008,
where the blue line (treatment group) is above the red line (comparison group). The
negative eﬀect is larger in the beginning of 2008 before the unemployment rate started
to increase.5 We can see from the figure that the new welfare system (NAV) did not
tackle the financial crisis as did the comparison municipalities. From the figure we
see that the blue line is above the red line in the spring of 2009. From then on both
groups have implemented the reform (post-reform period) and the diﬀerence between
the two groups are only minor in terms of unemployment rates when we compare
municipalities that implemented the reform in 2007 to those that implemented the
reform in 2009.
Figure 7 in the appendix shows the unemployment rate for municipalities that
implemented the reform in the second quarter of 2007 (blue line) and those that
implemented the reform in the second quarter of 2009 (red line). The early adopters
5The total eﬀect is the cumulative diﬀerence between the two lines over the relevant evaluation
period where we have both a treatment and comparison group.
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Figure 4: Average unemployment rate for two groups of municipalities; those that
implemented the reform in 2007 (blue line) and those that implemented the reform
in 2009. Unadjusted monthly data. Source: Statistics Norway (SSB) and Norwegian
Social Science Data Services (NSD).
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have a slightly higher unemployment rate prior to the reform. In the beginning of 2009
the gap begins to widen, and the municipalities that implemented the reform in 2007
continues to have higher unemployment rates compared to those that implemented
the reform in the second quarter of 2009. The figure indicates that the eﬀect of the
reform is negative for these municipalities.
Figure 8 in the appendix shows the unemployment rate for municipalities that
implemented the reform in the fourth quarter of 2007 (blue line) and those that im-
plemented the reform in the fourth quarter of 2009 (red line). Those municipalities
that implemented the reform late (i.e. fourth quarter 2009) had higher unemployment
rates compared to those that implemented the reform in the fourth quarter of 2007,
but the changes over time is similar. The fixed-eﬀect regression approach evaluates the
reform in terms of changes over time (diﬀ-in-diﬀ-approach). An important assumption
for the model is that the treatment and comparison groups experience the same kind
of development in unemployment rates prior to the reform. Figure 8 indicates that
this is actually the case. Thus, even if the level of unemployment is diﬀerent for the
two groups, we can still rely on the diﬀ-in-diﬀ-approach as a method of estimating the
eﬀect of the NAV reform.
Figure 4 indicates a small negative eﬀect on unemployment rates of the refom, as
do the other figures. An unconditional measure based on all municipalities indicate a
negative eﬀect of the NAV reform of around 0.05 percentage points on unemployment
rates (for instance from 3.40 percent unemployment to 3.45 percent unemployment),
which translates to around 1 percent more unemployed persons due to the NAV reform.
When doing the same unconditional analysis6 on all municipalities, we find similar
eﬀects. We also find that the smaller municipalities had a smaller negative eﬀect
compared to the larger municipalities on the unemployment rate at the municipality
level, where the diﬀerence is around 0.02 percentage points.
When we include municipality and year fixed eﬀects, as well as municipality-specific
time trends, e.g. as in Wolfers (2006), we find that the eﬀect drops to 0.03 percentage
points increased unemployment. A more dynamic specification, inspired by equation
(2) in Wolfers (2006), shows that the eﬀect improves somewhat over time and becomes
positive (i.e. reduces the unemployment rate) first after 2,5 years.
We have so far shown figures for unemployed persons only. The number of persons
on long-term sickness, rehabilitation, and disability pension also varies over time and
between municipalities. We can see that the number of long-term person on the
sickness benefit scheme increased somewhat more in NAV municipalities compared
6We include dummy variables for time (i.e. fixed-eﬀects for running month) and municipalities,
but include no other control variables.
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to the municipalities in the comparison groups, i.e. municipalities that have not yet
implemented the reform. These numbers also shows a small negative eﬀect, but the
figures are much messier, and are not reported here.
Before we move on to a more rigorous analysis of diﬀerent groups of users of social
insurance and social assistant schemes in Norway, we sketch some of the reforms that
have taken place in other European countries, tackling the fragmentation problem of
social security systems.
Results from reforms in other countries
In the recent decade, several western European countries have reformed their welfare
services to improve cooperation and coordination between diﬀerent institutions. This
reorientation has been characterized as “a paradigm shift in welfare state objectives
from income protection to labour-market integration” (Van Berkel and Borghi (2008)).
In an overview article, Champion and Bonoli (2011) categorize coordination initiatives
along two dimensions: how many types of services and benefits the reform encompasses
(“inclusiveness”) and to what extent the governance structure is changed, with mer-
gers as an extreme outcome (“intensity”). Champion and Bonoli (2011) characterize
the NAV reform as “one of the most radical coordination initiatives in Europe”. This
is because of the scope of the reform (1/3 of budget, encompasses a very wide range
of services and benefits, which implies that 50% of the population are in contact with
NAV each year (Hansen, Lundberg, and Syltevik (2013), chapter 1) and because the
reform involved a merger of two large state agencies followed by mandatory partner-
ships between central government and each municipality. Along the two dimensions
mentioned above, the NAV reform resembles most closely the establishment of Job-
centre Plus in the UK and the SUWI reform in the Netherlands, both implemented in
2002. In France and Denmark, intensive but less encompassing reforms have been set
into force (Champion and Bonoli (2011)).7
The UK Jobcentre Plus reform, like the NAV reform, was implemented gradually, as
it took several years to roll out the reform to all districts of the country. Karagiannaki
(2007) characterizes it a natural experiment, and study eﬀects in the first 2 years of the
implementation period. Data are at the district (as opposed to oﬃce) level, and the
independent variable is therefore the percentage of oﬃces within a district oﬀering the
integrated Jobcentre Plus services per quarter of year. Notably, there is no correction
7The UK has, alongside The Netherlands and countries such as Australia and the United States,
been at the forefront of implementing “active” welfare state reform, whereas Germany, for example,
is often viewed as a “laggard” of active welfare reform” (Christensen, Knuth, Lægreid, and Wiggan
(2009).
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for time trend in the analysis. The reform is estimated to have a positive eﬀect on job
entry outcomes (Karagiannaki (2007)).
The NAV reform is mainly a structural reform. The substance of the welfare
services remained little changed in the implementation period, with two exceptions:
“kvalifiseringsprogrammet” and “arbeidsavklaringspengar”. These benefits were im-
plemented in 2008 and May 2010, respectively. Notably, they were implemented on a
national basis, i.e., more or less independent of each municipality’s reform status at
that time. In contrast, the Hartz reforms in Germany brought about an important
change in the substance of the social security system, as unemployment and social
assistance were integrated into one new benefit.
The Hartz reforms in Germany were implemented in the years 2003-2005. It is con-
sidered the most far-reaching reform endeavour in the German welfare state (Jacobi
and Kluve (2006)). The broad aims of the reform were to improve employment ser-
vices and policy measures, activate the unemployed, and deregulate parts of the labour
market. An important cornerstone of the Hartz reforms was to improve the eﬀective-
ness and eﬃciency of the labour market services. This was done by modernising the
organizational structure of the local employment services along the lines of New Public
Management. The organizational change should facilitate better co-ordination of in-
stitutional arrangements, especially between active and passive policy measures. The
Hartz reform converted the former employment oﬃces into custumer-oriented one-stop
centres where every job-seeker is assigned to a fixed caseworker, which is somewhat
contrary to the generalist case worker competence strategy in the NAV reform.
The change of employment services into one-stop centres was evaluated by WZB
and infas (2005) using a conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-analysis, see section 4.
They used the fact that the new centres have been introduced at diﬀerent points in
time. Ten employment oﬃces that had been modernized into one-stop-centres were
matched to ten agencies that had not been changed at that time. The results were
evaluated in terms of integration into regular employment showed no significant eﬀects.
However, the observation period was maximum nine months, and the short observation
period could explain lack of significance according to Jacobi and Kluve (2006). WZB
and infas (2005) finds that the eﬀects are more positive in former East Germany,
where labour markets are poorer, and that the change into one-stop-centres work
better for men than women. Eichhorst and Kaiser (2006) discussed the Hartz and
Agenda packages, and whether the reforms are overrated or just need some time to
show the desired eﬀects.
Minas (2014) synthesizes the work on one-stop shops as a strategy to combat frag-
mentation of social security systems in Western European countries. Unemployed
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people loosely attached to the labour market, and people receiving social assistance
benefits often have multiple problems simultaneously which implies contact with sev-
eral diﬀerent public agency. The article focuses on integrated service models that
provide benefits or social assistance to unemployed persons. The analysis shows that
integrated services might not fulfill the promises of more seamless services and that
users might actually experience stricter work conditionality. This conclusion is based
on governmental reports, academic research, and interviews with experts in the field.
4 Empirical model and identification of causal ef-
fects
For each person  we have two potential outcomes (0 1) corresponding to the po-
tential outcomes in the untreated and treated states respectively. Let  = 1 denote
the receipt of treatment and  = 0 denote non-receipt of treatment. In our case
treatment indicates that a person lives in a municipality where the NAV reform has
been implemented, and non-treatment means that the NAV reform has still not been
implemented. All municipalities will eventually implement the reform. This happened
in 2011. Between 2006 and 2011 we had a dual system where some municipalities had
implemented the reform, indicated by  = 1, and some not, indicated by  = 0.
Let  be the measured outcome variable so that
 = 1 + (1−)0
This is the classical model of potential outcomes: see Neyman (1923), Fisher (1935),
Roy (1951), Cox (1958), Quandt (1972), Rubin (1978), and Heckman and Honore
(1990). The model can be used to estimate structural econometric models. The model
has two potential outcome states of which only one is observed for each individual at
a given point in time . 1 is the outcome of an individual under the NAV reform in
period , and 0 is the outcome of an individual under the previous system in period
.
The comparison of expected outcome conditional on the NAV reform can be linked
to the following eﬀect measure:
(| = 1)−(| = 0) = (1| = 1)−(0| = 1)
+ (0| = 1)−(0| = 0)
where  = 0 1 indicates whether an individual resides in a municipality that has
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implemented the NAV reform ( = 1) or not ( = 0) in period . (1| = 0)
is the expected outcome of participants had they not participated, (0| = 0) is
the expected outcome of non-participants, (1| = 1) is the expected outcome
of participants, and (0| = 1) is the expected outcome of non-participants had
they participated.
The term (1| = 1)−(0|1 = 1) show the outcome-eﬀect solely linked
to the NAV reform and is the average causal eﬀect of NAV reform for those who
participated. This is a conditional measure and we need identifying assumptions to be
able to estimate the eﬀect of the NAV reform, since we cannot observe an individual
both in a reform municipality and pre-reform municipality at the same time.
The Diﬀerence-In-Diﬀerence model (DID)
The model that will be used to analyse our problem whether the NAV reform increases
or decreases employment will be the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DID) model. Known
from the field of eﬀect evaluation, the DID-estimator is taking advantage of a compar-
ison group and a treatment group, and observing them over time before and after a
policy change. Our data structure is illustrated in Figure 5 below. The DID model is
Figure 5: Implementation of the reform.
one of several methods for analysing and evaluating social programs. The evaluation
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in itself seeks to estimate the diﬀerence in an outcome between the “treated” and “un-
treated” in the population, after a treatment has occurred. The DID-estimator hence
makes use of either two distinct time-periods (before and after) or an average over the
observations before and after the exogenous incident (Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith
(1999), Verbeek (2008), Angrist and Pischke (2008)). We seek to estimate:
(1+1| = 1)−(0+1| = 1) (1)
(1+1| = 1) is the expected outcome for the individuals or group that received
the treatment if they in fact were given the treatment. (0+1| = 1) is the
expected outcome for the individuals or group that did not receive a treatment if
they in fact were given the treatment. How can we estimate the population average
outcome for individuals who were not given treatment had they been given treatment
( = 1)? This counterfactual outcome is represented by (0+1| = 1).
We cannot observe a group or a person in two diﬀerent states at the same time.
What we seek to estimate is a measure of the expected outcome of those not treated
had they in fact received the treatment. We cannot just compare the after-treatment
outcomes of the two groups because they might have some other characteristics ren-
dering them not comparable from the outset Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999).
Hence we would most likely find an estimation-bias in that the diﬀerences might be due
to other factors than the treatment which we seek to evaluate, if we simply compare
the two groups of individuals after the exogenous incident.
We can more easily estimate (1+1| = 1). This equation is the estimated
outcome of the treated in a state of being treated. This can be estimated by using the
sample average for this group after the treatment, either at a specific point in time,
or to take the average over the time-periods in which we have data from after the
treatment.
Implementation of the Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Model
The DID-model assumes access to longitudinal data on both the treated and the
comparison group. It also assumes that the estimated diﬀerences between individuals
over time in the no-treatment outcome do not systematically change. What we mean
by this is, if there were no treatment, we should not expect any systematic diﬀerences
in the outcome-variables over time between the two groups. In fact in this case there
would not even be two groups, because there has not been any exogenous incident
dividing the individuals into groups. In the case of an exogenous incident, the groups
may have diﬀerent qualities from the outset rendering the outcomes diﬀerent, but this
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can be controlled for by using individual fixed-eﬀects. Some individuals might for
instance have a much higher initial level of outcome than the others, which would
ultimately result in diﬀerent levels of outcome also over time. The lack of systematic
change in the no-treatment outcome does not mean that the individuals have to be
homogenous from the beginning. In fact, we use these individual fixed-eﬀects to control
for heterogeneity amongst individuals.
We start oﬀ by observing a dependent variable  for the entire sample and we
propose that the exogenous incident, or the treatment, might have an impact on this
outcome. We observe  = 1 2      individuals over  = 1 2      time-periods. We
are assuming that this exogenous incident takes place sometime between period t and
t+1. We introduce a fixed-eﬀects model given by:
 =  +  +  +  (2)
where  indicates the fixed-eﬀects attributed to each individual in the sample, 
indicates the fixed-eﬀects attributed to each time-period, and  is an error-term which
is identically and independently distributed and is assumed to take the expected value
0 and constant variance 2. We assume that the binary variable  takes the value
−1 = 0 before a specific treatment for each individual while for some individuals it
takes the value +1 = 1 after these specific individuals where given the treatment.
Estimating deviations from means is algebraically the same as treating the indi-
vidual eﬀects as parameters to be estimated (Angrist and Pischke (2008)). We may
then eliminate these individual fixed-eﬀects by first calculating the individual averages
over time:
¯ =  + ¯ + ¯ + ¯ (3)
and then subtracting this from equation (2):
 − ¯ = ( − ) + ( − ¯) + ( − ¯) + ( − ¯) (4)
Here we have eliminated the individual fixed-eﬀects which make us able to make the
comparisons needed to evaluate the eﬀect of the reform. This approach is often termed
the within transformation. We may also eliminate the fixed eﬀects by first-diﬀerencing
the model (2). This essentially means that we subtract the time period from before
the treatment from the period after:
+1 − −1 = ( − ) + (+1 − −1) + (+1 −−1) + (+1 − −1) (5)
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or:
∆+1 = ∆+1 + ∆+1 +∆+1 (6)
For consistency we must assume that (∆+1∆+1) = 0. This condition do allow
correlation between for instance +1 and −1 in levels, but we have to assume
that they are uncorrelated in changes from one period to another. The assumption is
therefore not as strong as the strict exogeneity condition: () = 0 for all  .
We can estimate consistently the eﬀect of  with OLS from a regression of ∆+1 on
∆+1.
The estimate we get for  is the sample average of +1 − −1 for the treated
minus the sample average of +1 − −1 for the untreated. Define ∆¯ (+1) as
the average for the treated where +1 = 1 and ∆¯ (+1) as the average for the
untreated where +1 = 0. Then by performing an OLS regression we get:
ˆ = ∆¯ (+1) −∆¯ (+1)
= (¯ (+1) − ¯ (+1) )− (¯ (−1) − ¯ (−1) )
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator in given by ˆ. This is then first the diﬀerence
between the treated and untreated averages and secondly the diﬀerence over the two
time-periods. Figure 2: Illustration of research design and notation. The figure can
Figure 6: Research design and notation.
illustrate the DID-estimatore. Using first-diﬀerencing for illustration, we have that
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¯ (+1) will be an estimate on (1+1| = 1), and ¯ (+1) will be an estimate
for (0+1| = 1). ¯ (−1) is an estimate for (1−1| = 1) and ¯ (−1) is an
estimate for (0−1| = 0). We then see that:
ˆ = (¯ (+1) − ¯ (+1) )− (¯ (−1) − ¯ (−1) )
is an estimate of
ˆ =
∙
(1+1| = 1)−(0+1| = 0)−(1−1| = 1)−(0−1| = 0)
¸

5 Econometric specification
We are interested in testing whether the NAV reform has an eﬀect on employment
outcomes and the use of social insurance or social assistance. Define NAV as a dummy
variable equal to one if the person lives in a municipality that has implemented the
NAV reform and equal to zero if the person lives in a municipality where the old system
is still in place. We start by using a linear probability model for panel data with the
following specification
 = x0β + 1NAV + γ + γ + γ +  (7)
where x includes background variables such as educational level (eight categories),
marital status (three categories: unmarried/married/divorced), and number of chil-
dren (under the age of 11/18). γ is a set of dummy variables for individual (fixed-
eﬀects), γ is a set of year dummies (2003-2010), and γ is a set of dummy variables
for municipalities of which there are 435. The outcome variable  consists of three al-
ternative variables of which all are dummy variables: Empl ∈ {0 1} indicates whether
a person is employed at a given time, SI ∈ {0 1} indicate whether a person receives
some kind of social insurance (unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, etc) at a given
time, and SA ∈ {0 1} indicates whether a person receives social assistance. In the case
of a dichotomous outcome variable we have E() = Pr() and NAV is a dummy
variable in the regressions. 1 in equation (7) measures the eﬀect of the NAV reform
in percentage points.
Step-wise implementation
We also allow for the fact that the eﬀect of the NAV reform can change over time
by including interaction terms between the NAV dummy and time dummies after the
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implementation year:
 = x0β + 1NAV
+ 2NAV · 2Year+ 3NAV · 3Year+ 4NAV · 4Year
+ γ + γ + γ +  (8)
The first municipalities that implemented the NAV reform did this at the end of 2006,
see Figure 1. We define 2008 as the second year of NAV for those municipalities that
implemented the reform in 2006 and 2007. The parameter 1 will give the eﬀect of
the NAV reform the first year, 2 will give the eﬀect the second year, 3 after two
year, and 4 will give the eﬀect the fourth year. Most municipalities had implemented
the reform prior to 2010 but some (four) municipalities implemented the reform in
2010, so this year can also be used since we still have some municipalities defining the
comparison group in our data.
We also test for learning eﬀects, i.e. if the order of implementation of the reform at
the county level matters. We define the variable FPF as the order of implementation
at the county level, and use the following specification
 = x0β + 1NAV + 2 FPF + γ + γ + γ +  (9)
The idea is that municipalities could get feedback from early adopters at the county
level, and learn from their implementation process, since each county has their own
administration overseeing the implementation process.
We implement the linear probability model in equation (7) as a panel data fixed
eﬀect model.
Index model
We also estimate a fixed-eﬀect-logit-models. We start with the following index spe-
cification
∗ = x0β + NAV + γ + γ + γ +  (10)
 = 1 if ∗ ≥ 0
 = 0 if ∗  0
where
E(|x) = Pr( = 1|x) = Pr(x0β +  ≥ 0) = F(x0β)
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We use a logit specification of F(·), and estimate the model using the “xtlogit” model
in Stata. We specify a conditional fixed eﬀects model. For details see for instance
Arellano (2003), Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004), Pendergast, Gange, Newton,
Lindstrom, Palta, and Fisher (1996).
6 Data set
We start out by using several diﬀerent data set in the analysis of the eﬀect of the
NAV reform. First, we look at three diﬀerent groups of users of NAV: a) Long-term
unemployed (unemployed for more than 6 months), b) School drop-outs (person not
finishing high school), c) Long-term sickness absence (length of sick leave is greater
than 6 months).
We sample our data in three diﬀerent ways, where we include person full-filling
our inclusion criteria. a) Sample persons up to the beginning of the implementation
period of the NAV reform in October 2006, which is our main specification. b) Sample
persons up to the NAV reform was implemented in the particular municipality in
which the person live. c) Sample person up to and including 2009. Data sampling
procedure in c) (and b)) can create endogeneity bias since inclusion of persons in our
data set is done also after the implementation of the NAV reform. For instance, if
the NAV reform has a positive eﬀect, then this could aﬀect the number of persons in
our sample and thus bias the estimated eﬀects. Suppose we sample persons prior the
reform and include persons whose length of sick leave are more than 6 months, and
look at employment status for instance one year after. Now suppose the NAV reform
has a positive eﬀect in the sense of reducing length of sick leave. If a person was sick
for more than 6 months prior to the reform, there is a possibility that the same person
(or similar persons) would only be sick for instance 5 months and 30 days in the case
if NAV had already been implemented and had a positive eﬀect on sickness outcomes.
In that case, the person would not be included in the sample, and by that bias the
estimated eﬀect on for instance employment status. We use specification b) and c)
as a sensitivity analysis. We also do sensitivity analysis on issues relating to persons
moving between municipalities.
The NAV reform is not an individual treatment but an organizational reform at
the municipality or city district level. Thus it is very important to cluster at the
municipality level. Our model is non-nested since individuals can move between mu-
nicipalities from one period to another. We use the clustering option for non-nested
models when estimation the standard error in our models. Clustering has a large eﬀect
on standard error, since the reform status vary between only 435 municipality or city
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districts, while we have several hundred t
***
7 Results
The main results from our analysis are reported in Table 1. The eﬀects are generally
small and negative, and for some of our specifications we do not find a significant
eﬀect of the NAV reform. The NAV reform has not increased the number of employed
persons is the main conclusion. Table 1 do not report all our specifications, but the
main result is robust to diﬀerent samples and specifications. Our first set of models
Table 1: Estimating the eﬀect of the NAV reform on employment. Numbers are in
percentage points except for the logit model.
Uempl (1) Uempl (2) Sick leave (3) Sick leave (4) Drop outs (5)
NAV -0.92(-2.08) -1.12(-6.84) -1.26(-0.87) -0.72(-0.05) -0.45(-0.64)
NAV (logit) -4.31(-3.12) -5.10(-3.47) -3.21(-1.37) -2.82(-0.87) -0.88(-0.06)
NAV -1.06(-3.65) -1.16(-3.96) -1.25(-0.88) -0.87(-0.72) -0.95(-2.42)
NAV FP 0.21(5.04) 0.19(5.79) 0.25(0.87) 0.01(1.86) 0.08(4.24)
NAV 1st year -1.04(-1.96) -1.23(-2.19) -1.43(0.97) — —
NAV 2nd year -0.71(-1.47) -1.05(-1.59) -1.42(0.98) — —
NAV 3rd year -0.21(-0.84) 0.44(0.71) 0.49(0.45) — —
NAV 4th year 0.15(0.56) 0.85(1.35) 0.36(0.36) — —
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Numbers are presented in percentage points.
t statistics in parentheses. Outcome variable: Employment. Individual fixed-eﬀects
dummies are included but are not reported. Other background variables (X) are
also included, i.e. dummies for educational level, marital status, children, etc, but
are not reported.
Standard error are clustered at the municipality or city district level.
NAV FP = Order of implementation at county level (0-12).
Column 1: Sample up to and including 2006 (long term unemployed). Column 2:
Sample up to and including 2009 (long term unemployed). Column 3: Sample up to
and including 2006 (long term sick). Column 4: Sample up to and including 2009
(long term sick). Column 5: Sample up to and including 2006 (school drop outs).
reported in the first row in the table is based on equation (7). In this specification,
we estimate the eﬀect of the NAV reform using a dummy variable for the reform.
The numbers are reported in percentage points. We find that the reform for diﬀerent
groups of potential NAV uses decreases the probability of employment by around one
percentage points. This is similar to unconditional measures we find as indicated for
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instance in Figure 4. The negative eﬀect is significantly diﬀerent from zero for the
unemployment sample, and diﬀerent versions of this sample. However, after clustering
at the municipality level, the eﬀect is estimated to be negative but is not statistically
diﬀerent from zero for the sample of persons on long-term sick leave and school drop-
outs, as reported in column 3-5 in Table 1.
We also estimate equation (7) for diﬀerent groups of users. Table 3 in the appendix
shows the results where we analyse the eﬀect of NAV for males and females separately,
as well as for small and large municipalities. We find only minor diﬀerences for males
and females. However, we find a more negative eﬀect of the NAV reform for larger
municipalities compared to smaller municipalities, where we have defined large and
small based on a cut oﬀ level of 5000 inhabitants. Andreassen, Drange, Thune, and
Monkerud (2007) concludes that the implementation of the reform has been easier for
smaller municipalities. Table 4 shows the results for the logit specifications for the
long term unemployed sample, where we show the results divided by gender and also
age where we devide the sample in two at age 45 (columns 4 and 5).
The logit specification based on equation (10) confirms the results from the linear
probability model. Two things should be commented on regarding this model. First,
the estimated regression coeﬃcient is not interpreted as the coeﬃcients in the linear
probability model, where the eﬀect is in percentage points. There is no clear cut way
to change these logit coeﬃcients to marginal (percentage points) coeﬃcients. Thus,
the magnitude of the eﬀects are not comparable to the other models, but the sign
and significant level can be interpreted straightforward. Thus, we can conclude from
the logit specifications that the eﬀect is negative also in these models. Second, the
logit model for panel data (xtlogit) only use the sample for which persons change their
employment status. Thus, in these models we do not uses persons that either are
unemployed for the entire period, or employed for the entire period, meaning that the
sample used in the logit model are always smaller compared to the sample in the other
models.
Our third model specification is based on equation (9), confer rows 3-4 in Table
1. Here we define a variable where we test for learning eﬀects, i.e. if the order of
implementation of the reform at the county level matters. We find a positive learning
eﬀect at the county level. Thus, those municipalities that implemented the reform late
compared to others in their county have slightly better eﬀect compared the those that
implemented the reform early. Again, these eﬀects are significant only for the sample
of long term unemployed.
Our last specification is based on equation 8, see rows 5-8 in Table 1. In this
specification we allow for the fact that the eﬀect of the NAV reform can change over
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time by including interaction terms between the NAV dummy and dummies for number
of years after the implementation year. We define 2008 as the second year of NAV for
those municipalities that implemented the reform in 2006 and 2007. These regressions
indicates that the eﬀect of the NAV reform improves slightly over time. We find a
significant negative eﬀect on employment the first year. The eﬀect is less negative for
the second year, and tends to become zero for the last year. However, we find very
few significant eﬀects for this specification.
We also estimate the models using social insurance and social assistance as out-
come variables, both as a linear probability model and conditional logit model. For
both these two outcome variables we do not find indications that the reform has had
any positive eﬀects, and the results confirm our conclusion from Table 1 that the point
estimate are unfavourable from a welfare state point of view. Persons living in mu-
nicipalities that have implemented the reform at a given point in time have higher
use of social insurance and social assistance compared to persons living in municipal-
ities that have not yet implemented the reform. The results for social insurance are
reported in Table 2 below. In the specification where we estimate the eﬀect of the
NAV reform on the use of social assistance defined as an indicator variable and where
NAV is a dummy variable as in equation (7) we find that the use of social assistance is
increased by almost 1 percentage points due to the NAV reform, and thus the reform
is not successful in decreasing the use of social assistance. This result is robust to
diﬀerent data samples and econometrics specifications. The logit specification based
on equation (10) confirms the results from the linear probability model. The specific-
ation based on equation (9) indicates some positive learning eﬀects, i.e. if the order
of implementation of the reform at the county level matters. Municipalities that im-
plemented the eﬀect late at the county level has a slightly better eﬀect compared the
those that implemented the eﬀect early.
Our last specification reported in Table 2 is based on equation 8. In this specific-
ation we allow for the fact that the eﬀect of the NAV reform can change over time
by including interaction terms between the NAV dummy and dummies for number of
years after the implementation year. We find very few significant eﬀects, and we cannot
conclude the the NAV reform have had any favourable eﬀects on social assistance.
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Table 2: Estimating the eﬀect of the NAV reform on social assistance. Numbers are
in percentage points.
Uempl (1) Uempl (2) Sick leave (3) Sick leave (4) Drop outs (5)
NAV 0.76(1.98) 0.84(3.84) 0.87(0.76) 0.98(0.45) 0.96(1.24)
NAV (logit) 2.23(2.32) 3.82(2.61) 2.71(1.69) 2.38(1.12) 1.88(1.52)
NAV 1.02(2.37) 1.23(2.42) 0.95(1.18) 0.87(0.72) 1.03(1.62)
NAV FP -0.18(-2.13) -0.19(2.37) -0.21(-1.31) -0.08(-1.64) -0.18(-1.76)
NAV 1st year 0.98(1.97) 0.99(2.15) 1.03(1.18) 1.07(1.49) -
NAV 2nd year 0.54(1.38) 0.76(1.64) 0.98(0.87) 0.76(1.11) -
NAV 3rd year 0.21(-0.82) -0.23(-0.87) -0.37(-0.92) 0.07(1.03) -
NAV 4th year -0.09(-0.76) -0.39(-1.16) -0.31(-1.51) -0.17(-1.15) -
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Numbers are presented in percentage points except for the logit specifica-
tion.
t statistics in parentheses. Outcome variable: Employment. Individual fixed-eﬀects
dummies are included but are not reported. Other background variables (X) are
also included, i.e. dummies for educational level, marital status, children, etc, but
are not reported.
Standard error are clustered at the municipality or city district level.
NAV FP = Order of implementation at county level (0-12).
Column 1: Sample up to and including 2006 (long term unemployed). Column 2:
Sample up to and including 2009 (long term unemployed). Column 3: Sample up to
and including 2006 (long term sick). Column 4: Sample up to and including 2009
(long term sick). Column 5: Sample up to and including 2006 (school drop outs).
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8 Conclusion
A national labour and welfare administration reform (NAV) is evaluated on employ-
ment outcomes and use of social insurance and social assistance. We focused on groups
that have a high risk of needing the services from NAV. The reform was implemented
step-wise over time at diﬀerent geographical locations. Thus, we are able to create
treatment and control groups to facilitate causal interpretations of the empirical res-
ults. We use a unique data set on individuals where we match local implementation
of the reform to individual data on social security, employment, and socioeconomic
characteristics. The labour and welfare administration was until 2006 fragmented,
involving three large public agencies (employment, social assistance, and social insur-
ance services), with limited coordination and collaborations. The reform merged these
institutions into a new organization called NAV, after the “one door for all” principle.
The idea was to help users to get faster back to work after a period of sickness or
unemployment through coordinated help by generalist case worker competence.
We find that the reform failed to reap the intended benefits of the merger process.
We find that the NAV reform decreased the individual employment propensity by
around 1 percentage points. However, there seems to be indications that the eﬀect of
NAV improves slightly over time.
The lack of positive eﬀects of the NAV reform could be related to the fact that most
users still demand specialized case worker competence and to inadequate planning of
IT infrastructure. Large bureaucratic reforms can take many years to implement after
a turbulent implementation face, and can have large short term costs for users, as
indicated by this specific reform. The turbulence of the reform was not anticipated
even though 25 municipalities and city districts participated in a pilot project 6 months
before the country-wide implementation process started.
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Sample of long term unemployed
Table 3: Estimating the eﬀect of the NAV reform on employment for diﬀerent groups.
All/males/female/small/large.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Empl Empl Empl Empl Empl
2004.year -0.100∗∗∗ -0.0954∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.0991∗∗∗
(-63.52) (-41.71) (-48.22) (-22.10) (-59.62)
2005.year -0.231∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗
(-146.22) (-98.13) (-108.92) (-50.61) (-137.35)
2006.year -0.329∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.340∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗
(-202.52) (-139.40) (-147.40) (-66.40) (-191.41)
2007.year -0.154∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(-93.32) (-54.08) (-78.21) (-35.57) (-86.82)
2008.year -0.0387∗∗∗ -0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0544∗∗∗ -0.0936∗∗∗ -0.0342∗∗∗
(-21.26) (-8.78) (-21.59) (-14.55) (-17.99)
2009.year -0.00800∗∗∗ -0.00773∗∗ -0.00937∗∗∗ -0.0557∗∗∗ -0.00472∗∗
(-3.65) (-2.45) (-3.08) (-7.29) (-2.06)
2010.year -0.00314 -0.00685∗∗ -0.000972 -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.000320
(-1.38) (-2.09) (-0.31) (-6.01) (-0.13)
NAV -0.0112∗∗∗ -0.00930∗∗∗ -0.0130∗∗∗ 0.00771 -0.0115∗∗∗
(-6.84) (-3.93) (-5.76) (1.35) (-6.71)
Constant 0.292∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(163.57) (120.27) (109.56) (50.90) (155.58)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 754097 367548 386549 71390 682707
t statistics in parentheses
Outcome variable: Employment. Background variables (X) are also included, i.e.
dummies for educational level, marital status, children, etc, but these are not
reported.
Column 1: All individuals. Column 2: Males. Column 3: Females.
Column 4: Small municipality. Column 5: Large municipality.
Sample of long term unemployed, where sampling is up to and including 2009.
∗   01, ∗∗   005, ∗∗∗   001
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Table 4: Estimating the eﬀect of the NAV reform on employment. Fixed-eﬀects logit
estimates. (34)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Empl Empl Empl Empl Empl
Empl(dummy)
2004.year -0.825∗∗∗ -0.759∗∗∗ -0.894∗∗∗ -0.849∗∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗
(-62.39) (-40.60) (-47.75) (-45.12) (-45.98)
2005.year -2.219∗∗∗ -2.061∗∗∗ -2.395∗∗∗ -2.266∗∗∗ -2.928∗∗∗
(-140.52) (-93.96) (-104.82) (-100.62) (-92.86)
2006.year -24.56 -23.80 -23.35 -25.11 -23.57
(-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.02) (-0.05)
2007.year -1.558∗∗∗ -1.222∗∗∗ -1.927∗∗∗ -1.477∗∗∗ -2.700∗∗∗
(-101.80) (-58.03) (-85.76) (-67.75) (-85.11)
2008.year -0.606∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -1.837∗∗∗
(-36.80) (-16.38) (-35.89) (-18.28) (-55.80)
2009.year -0.417∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.563∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -1.691∗∗∗
(-20.70) (-10.55) (-19.23) (-6.61) (-41.90)
2010.year -0.418∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.554∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -1.726∗∗∗
(-19.76) (-10.55) (-18.02) (-5.56) (-40.93)
NAV (logit coeﬀ) -0.0494∗∗∗ -0.0330 -0.0700∗∗∗ -0.0472∗∗ -0.0375
(-3.25) (-1.56) (-3.19) (-2.21) (-1.20)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 434881 215201 219680 221500 123013
2
LL -133478.7 -67454.3 -65441.6 -67026.7 -34377.2
AIC 266991.4 134942.7 130917.1 134087.5 68788.5
t statistics in parentheses
Outcome variable: Employment. Individual fixed-eﬀects dummies are included
but are not reported. Other background variables (X) are also included, i.e.
dummies for educational level, marital status, children, etc, but are not
reported. Logit estimates.
Column 1: All individuals. Column 2: Males. Column 3: Females.
Column 4: Below age 45. Column 5: Above age 45.
Sample of long term unemployed, where sampling is up to and including 2009.
∗   01, ∗∗   005, ∗∗∗   001
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Table 5: Estimating the eﬀect of the NAV reform on employment. Random-eﬀects
estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Empl Empl Empl Empl Empl
2004.year -0.111∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(-65.42) (-43.24) (-49.43) (-22.47) (-61.49)
2005.year -0.251∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(-148.04) (-99.30) (-110.38) (-50.60) (-139.25)
2006.year -0.340∗∗∗ -0.340∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
(-197.25) (-136.32) (-143.05) (-65.16) (-186.28)
2007.year -0.177∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(-99.84) (-59.44) (-82.17) (-37.12) (-93.07)
2008.year -0.0622∗∗∗ -0.0475∗∗∗ -0.0772∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.0575∗∗∗
(-31.55) (-16.79) (-28.18) (-16.92) (-27.91)
2009.year -0.0313∗∗∗ -0.0314∗∗∗ -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.0809∗∗∗ -0.0275∗∗∗
(-13.27) (-9.26) (-9.82) (-9.96) (-11.14)
2010.year -0.0259∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗ -0.0226∗∗∗ -0.0699∗∗∗ -0.0227∗∗∗
(-10.58) (-8.68) (-6.63) (-8.58) (-8.83)
NAV -0.00477∗∗∗ -0.00331 -0.00620∗∗ 0.00943 -0.00480∗∗∗
(-2.69) (-1.30) (-2.52) (1.55) (-2.59)
Constant 0.290∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(153.09) (113.60) (100.68) (49.03) (145.19)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 639936 314801 325135 62127 577809
t statistics in parentheses
Outcome variable: Employment. Background variables (X) are also included, i.e.
dummies for educational level, marital status, children, etc, but these are not
reported.
Column 1: All individuals. Column 2: Males. Column 3: Females.
Column 4: Small municipality. Column 5: Large municipality.
Sample of long term unemployed, where sampling is up to and including 2006.
∗   01, ∗∗   005, ∗∗∗   001
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Sample of long term sick
Table 6: Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) 2007-2010: Full sample
(2)
All individuals Nav=0 group Nav=1 group
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Outcome variables:
Empl(dummy) 0.168 0.369 0.170 0.375 0.165 0.352
SI(dummy) 0.719 0.450 0.712 0.453 0.735 0.441
SA(dummy) 0.0874 0.282 0.0892 0.285 0.0826 0.275
SI amount/1000 129.4 90.79 128.5 91.44 131.7 89.03
WorkIncome/1000 37.16 93.79 39.28 97.67 31.62 82.60
WorkIncome/1000/zeros 176.2 136.0 180.4 140.1 163.8 122.1
Wyrkinnt/1000 95.39 179.8 96.49 180.8 92.54 177.2
Education level:
Edu_2 0.346 0.476 0.347 0.476 0.342 0.474
Edu_3 0.186 0.389 0.183 0.387 0.193 0.395
Edu_4 0.260 0.439 0.260 0.439 0.259 0.438
Edu_5 0.0329 0.178 0.0339 0.181 0.0303 0.172
Edu_6 0.138 0.345 0.136 0.343 0.144 0.351
Edu_7 0.0210 0.144 0.0213 0.144 0.0203 0.141
Other variables:
Married 0.467 0.499 0.465 0.499 0.474 0.499
Divorced 0.224 0.417 0.228 0.419 0.215 0.411
Child0_18 0.877 1.122 0.881 1.127 0.868 1.108
Child0_6 0.304 0.663 0.306 0.664 0.300 0.659
Age 44.70 9.894 44.60 9.879 44.94 9.929
Note: Sample of long term sick, where sampling is up to and including 2006 (first year=2007).
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Figure 7: Average unemployment rate for two groups of municipalities; those that
implemented the reform in the second quarter of 2007 (blue line) and those that
implemented the reform in the second quarter of 2009. Unadjusted monthly data.
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB) and Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD).
Note: The period in which we have a treatment group (the 2007 group) and a comparison
group (the 2009) group is defined as the period between May 2007 and May 2009.
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Figure 8: Average unemployment rate for two groups of municipalities; those that
implemented the reform in the fourth quarter of 2007 (blue line) and those that imple-
mented the reform in the fourth quarter of 2009. Unadjusted monthly data. Source:
Statistics Norway (SSB) and Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD).
Note: The period in which we have a treatment group (the 2007 group) and a comparison
group (the 2009) group is defined as the period between November 2007 and November
2009.
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